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Abstract
This chapter studies the impact of financial reporting quality on firms’ market perfor-
mance in a sample of LATAM corporations. We infer that, especially in contexts of high
information asymmetry, investors are not able to effectively discern the quality of the
information they are provided with and can therefore be misled in their investment
decisions by managerial opportunism. Our theoretical framework is built upon a com-
bined agency theory and cognitive approach. We thereby seek to provide a valuable
method to better understand how investors could be making suboptimal choices as a
consequence of managers’ opportunistic behaviour. Empirically, we use the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) model, hypothesizing that a positive relationship should
be observed between the opportunistic manipulation of earnings (that is, the misuse of
accounting accruals) and the firm’s market performance (that is, the consequential
behaviour of investors). Through this ‘pioneering’ methodology, applied to the rela-
tively under-researched LATAM region, we find that: (1) Financial data are identifiably
and consistently manipulated through discretionary accruals in these countries. (2) As
manipulation increases, markets do tend to appear more attractive to investors. (3) The
elasticity of the market reaction to this manipulation is higher in what we term ‘opaque’
countries.
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agency theory, social cognitive approach
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
The best plan is… to profit by the folly of others. Taken from Pliny the Elder, by John Bartlett,
Familiar Quotations, 10th ed. 1909.
Recent corporate scandals across the globe have drawn attention to the field of corporate
governance. Users of financial information such as investors, governments and regulators are
increasingly concerned about how earnings numbers are derived [1]. This is due in large part
to the countless examples of managers who have used their discretionary decision-making
power to misreport their firms’ profits. Petrobras in Brazil, which overpriced contracts for
private benefits, or Disco in Argentina, which was found to have inappropriately recorded
the financial results from several joint ventures, are just two examples of high profile firms that
have inflated their earnings, to the detriment of investors and in direct contradiction to the
provisions of governments and regulators.
This chapter studies the impact of financial reporting quality on firms’ market performance in
a sample of LATAM corporations, using these data to examine the perception processes of
investors as a mediating variable between reporting quality and market performance. Specifi-
cally, we address whether the perceived performance of an organization is in reality based
upon actual organizational performance, or is instead more a function of the results overtly
exhibited in the organization’s financial reporting structures, which may have been
discretionally manipulated. We propose that, especially in contexts of high asymmetry of
information, investors are not able to effectively discern the quality of information provided
to them for decision-making purposes and can therefore be easily ‘fooled’ by managerial
opportunism.
Empirically, we base this upon data collected in six Latin American countries by applying the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model [2], thereby hypothesizing that a positive
relationship will be observed between the opportunistic manipulation of earnings and the
firm’s market performance. We then examine these results using a lens that combines agency
theory with a social cognitive approach, to analyse the manipulated perception process that
occurs as a result of that relationship.
There are a number of principal contributions from this chapter. We begin by viewing the
process of manipulation with a holistic approach that integrates both a cognitive and agency
perspective and allows us to better understand the relationship between earnings manage-
ment, financial reporting quality and market performance as a whole, thereby providing a
more comprehensive vision of the entire process. This contribution is even more valuable
because we have situated our study in the under-researched context of Latin America. We also
believe that we are the first to apply the GMM methodology in this context, empirically
showing how financial manipulation occurs and then impacts upon investor decisions, thus
influencing the organization’s market valuation. By doing so we have created an algorithm and
adapted an overall model that can be more generally used to rank the quality of any earnings
reports, thereby contributing to a more transparent market information system. Finally, we
hope that our research will go on to inform and serve decision-makers who analyse firms’
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financial statements, as well as act as a catalyst to governments, institutions and policy-makers
in deriving policy and promoting market efficiency.
Our most important findings can be summarized to be the following. Our results show: (1)
Financial data are identifiably and consistently manipulated through discretionary accruals in
these countries. (2) As manipulation increases, markets do tend to appear more attractive to
investors. (3) The elasticity of the market reaction to this manipulation is higher in what we
term ‘opaque’ countries.
The steps we take in this chapter begin with our theoretical framework, where we review the
relevant literature, illustrate this with a comprehensive model of the overall process and then
state our hypothesis. As a second step, we then proceed with the empirical analysis through
the operationalization of our baseline model and the construction of our variables. In our third
step, we present and discuss our results. We do this by displaying and analysing both the
univariate and multivariate analysis and by segmenting the sample into clusters based on the
country-level governance system, calling them ‘opaque’ (lower level of governance) or ‘trans-
parent’ (higher level of governance) countries. Our conclusions and final remarks are
presented at the end of the chapter, where we also address policy recommendations.
2. Theoretical framework
The extent to which financial statements reflect actual operating fundamentals is of growing
concern throughout the world, especially in emerging markets where managerial controls and
practices can vary substantially from those in the USA or Europe. Some more economically
developed countries have passed legislation to ensure better corporate governance and have
adopted codes of good conduct in order to reduce the asymmetries of information between
shareholders and the firm and to increase the rational component of the decision-making
process around choosing one’s investments [3, 4]. At the same time, a large difference in the
quality of financial reporting across countries has been extensively documented [5]. This has
led, according to the behavioural finance approach, to the conclusion that the perception of
market participants is likely to be biased as a consequence of the lack of transparency in
pricing and the poor quality of financial information [6]. Such losses in the quality of financial
information have been modelled through earnings management [7].
Earnings management can be defined as the adjustment of a firm’s reported economic perfor-
mance by insiders, done either to mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual out-
comes [8, 9]. Earnings management is considered to be the most informative and trustworthy
to investors if it is supported by what is perceived to be a good system of governance.
However, the act of managing earnings does not necessarily reflect the true performance of
the company, a situation that may contribute to shareholders and investors making inaccurate
judgements about the company [9]. To examine this, we first turn to agency theory, well used
in the financial arena, which holds that managerial behaviour can be opportunistic and fuelled
by self-interest. Most importantly for our purposes, it accounts for the existence of
asymmetries of information between managers and shareholders. Executives accept agent
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status because they perceive an opportunity to maximize their own utility [10]. Consequently,
agency theory holds that managers may take advantage of the information they have and their
latitude in making accounting and reporting decisions to overstate financial information. They
generally do this by acting in what they perceive to be in their own interest [11]. Reducing
agency costs by imposing internal mechanisms of control should therefore encourage man-
agers to behave in the best interest of shareholders instead of in their own interests. However,
because controls are imperfect, we would expect some degree of opportunism to remain [10].
Since managers are widely paid based on firm’s performance, it is plausible to expect that
active earnings manipulation will occur in order to enhance managerial compensation pack-
ages [12]. This approach is highly focussed on bounded rational decision making around
incentives, information and self-interest. Thus, it is a viewpoint that suggests that it may be
necessary to limit managers’discretion with respect to accounting, since investors, as a conse-
quence of asymmetrically distributed market information, cannot unravel the valuation effect
of reported earnings in a timely manner under current reporting standards.
We suggest, however, that in addition to agency theory, a more cognitive viewpoint can also be
used, to guide and further understand managerial behaviour. Social cognitive theory advocates
that behaviour, cognitive and other personal factors and the external environment are the three
main factors that drive the decision-making process [13]. These three factors are known to be
asymmetrical, similar to the asymmetry of information in agency theory, in that they do not
influence each other simultaneously, instantly or with equal strength, but they do influence each
other multidirectionally. As a result, both investors and managers can be understood to be
making decisions based upon a combination of factors that include a triad of perceptual, environ-
mental and behavioural elements, all converging to ultimately produce an investment decision.
Regarding cognition, two of the most relevant elements related to decision making are mana-
gerial biases and heuristics. The most common biases that managers revert to using include
representativeness, availability and anchoring-and-adjustment [14] although there are now
many other biases and heuristics that have been studied at length in a financial context [15].
The use of heuristics is considered a necessary way for humans to cope with our more limited
capacity to process information [16]. More specifically to our study, many researchers have
identified the biases and heuristics used in making financial decisions as highly relevant to
understand the human and cognitive elements of the processes involved [6, 17]. Thus,
according to the social cognitive approach, the market may wrongly perceive the actual firm
performance disclosed in financial reports, as a consequence of biases and heuristics held
perceptually and socially, in addition to behavioural and environmental elements. Thus, when
managers overstate a firm’s earnings, due to their bounded rationality and to information
asymmetries, they can be easily misled to overprice the firm’s shares.
As described in Figure 1, by suggesting a complementary relation between agency and social
cognition theories, we have produced a model that further explains how this process occurs
and shows how the process is reinforced by the lack of sound corporate governance systems in
the institutional context of Latin American countries, as is our case.
Financial markets in the region are still in a stage of early development, which allows managers
to make use of accounting discretion to manipulate financial information. In immature financial
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markets, where there are large imbalances of information and opacity, and where the markets
are not integrated, investors may not be able to discriminate between companies that provide
high or low quality information [18, 19]. Therefore, in the midst of inefficient financial markets in
Latin America, managers have more room to manipulate financial statements. Leuz et al. [20]
present evidence that the level of outside investor protection endogenously determines the
quality of financial information reported to outsiders, showing how legal protection influences
the agency conflicts between investors and controlling shareholders. In Latin America investor
protection is weak, and this therefore gives insiders more incentives to manipulate earnings. In
conclusion, in the institutional context of Latin America, investors suffer more acutely the
consequences of earnings manipulation by managers when compared to more developed finan-
cial systems, and therefore they may not be able to make optimal investment decisions.
Therefore, based upon the previous arguments regarding agency theory, cognitive theory and
the institutional setting in Latin America, we hypothesize that:
H1: A positive relationship is expected between the opportunistic manipulation of earnings and the
firm’s market performance.
3. Baseline model and empirical analysis
3.1. Sample
The sample we use corresponds to 896 representative large non-financial firms from Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Data at firm level are collected from the
Thomson Reuters dataset and data at the country level are collected from Worldwide
Figure 1. Theoretical and contextual framework, a basis for the operationalized model.
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Governance Indicators obtained from the updated work of Kaufmann et al. [21].1 The sample
corresponds to unbalanced panel data with a total of 9647 firm-year observations over the
period from 1997 to 2013.
We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model to deal with the characteristic
econometric problems of unobservable heterogeneity of individual firms and endogeneity [2, 22].
Several statistical contrasts are used as diagnostic tests for our panel data structures (e.g. the
Hansen test for the validity of instruments, the second-order serial correlation test AR(2), the
Wald test of joint significance of parameters, and the variance inflation factor (VIF) as a formal
multicollinearity test). Additionally, non-linear restriction tests are used for those interacted
(multiplicative) variables.
3.2. Variable construction
Key to this study is the definition and analysis of our proxy independent variable of earnings
manipulation, which corresponds to our measure of managerial discretion and quality of
financial reporting. Two alternative estimations of earnings management are used based on
absolute discretionary accruals. Since total accruals are known, the discretionary accruals must
be estimated. Based on Dechow et al. [23], the total accrual (ACCit) denotes the component of
earnings for each i firm during the t period computed as:
ACCit ¼ ðΔCAit  ΔCashitÞ  ðΔCLit  ΔSTDitÞ Depit ð1Þ
where CA denotes current assets, Cash is the cash and cash equivalent, CL are current liabili-
ties, STD stands for short-term debt and the current proportion of long-term debt, and Dep is
the annual depreciation expense.
Thus, once the total accruals are calculated, we have to split them into their non-discretionary
and discretionary components. Non-discretionary accruals are aimed to improve the informa-
tional content of financial statements. According to the Jones [24] model, total accruals are
affected by the firm’s usual business (which can affect non-cash current assets and liabilities)
and by fixed assets (which can affect the depreciation expense). Consequently, ACC are
regressed depending on the change in sales (ΔSalesit) and the gross level of property, plant
and equipment (PPEit) in the following equation:
ACCMod1it
Ait1
¼ β0 þ β1
ΔSalesit
Ait1
þ β2
PPEit
Ait1
þ εit ð2Þ
Regarding the expected signs for β1and β2 it can be said that this is not trivial, except for β2,
where a negative sign is expected because depreciation has been included with a negative sign
in the definition of total accruals (ACC). However, there is no clear prediction for the sign of β1
because, on the one hand, a higher level of sales might imply higher accounts receivables but,
on the other hand, increase in sales usually imply increase in short-term debt too, so the net
effect on working capital may not be determined a priori.
1The latest update took place in September 2014. Information can be downloaded from www.govindicators.org.
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Hence, the value of (ACC) in Eq. (2) is the level of total accruals, depending on the firm’s
activity and the composition of the firm’s assets. Therefore, the error term in the regression,
which is the difference between observed and estimated accruals as stated in Eq. (3) would
become the part of total accruals that is due to the discretionary behaviour of managers. So the
first measure of discretionary accruals (DACC1it) should take the form:
DACC1it
Ait1

 ¼
ACCit
Ait1
 β^0
1
Ait1
þ β^1
ΔSalesit
Ait1
þ β^2
PPEit
Ait1
 
ð3Þ
where β^0, β^1, and β^2 are the estimators for β0, β1, and β2 coefficients, respectively. Since the
discretionary behaviour in earnings management may be used either to increase or reduce
earnings, we follow Gabrielsen et al. [25] and calculate the absolute value for DACC to
measure the extent of this discretionary behaviour instead of its direction.
Similarly, and as stated earlier, our second proxy measure of discretionary accruals also follows a
cross-sectional model based on the Jones [24] model as described by Dechow et al. [23] as:
ACCit
Ait1
¼ β0 þ β1
ΔSalesit  ΔARit
Ait1
þ β2
PPEit
Ait1
þ εit ð4Þ
The coefficient estimates from Eq. (4) are used to estimate the firm-specific non-discretional
accruals as:
NDACCit ¼ β^0
1
Ait1
þ β^1
ΔSalesit  ΔARit
Ait1
þ β^2
PPEit
Ait1
ð5Þ
where ΔARit is the change in accounts receivable from the preceding year. Following Cohen et al.
[26], while computing the non-discretionary accruals, we adjust the reported revenues on the
sample of firms for the change in accounts receivable to capture any potential accounting
discretion arising from sale credits. Then, the second measure of discretionary accruals is the
difference between total accruals and the fitted non-discretionary accruals (DACC2it), defined as:
DACC2it
Ait1

 ¼
ACCit
Ait1
 β^0
1
Ait1
þ β^1
ΔSalesit  ΔARit
Ait1
þ β^2
PPEit
Ait1
 
ð6Þ
Similar to the first measure, we also compute discretionary accruals in their absolute values.
In our models, the firm market performance as a dependent variable is computed through a
number of alternative measures. First, we use the market return (MP1it) calculated as the
annual change in the stock price for the firm i in the period t. The second measure of perfor-
mance is based on the enterprise value (MP2it) calculated as the market capitalization, plus
debt, minority interests and preferred shares, minus cash and cash equivalent for the firm i in
the period t. To avoid the bias produced by scale issues, the enterprise value is computed in
logarithms, which is the usual transformation applied to positive values with high dispersion.
Finally, in our third measure of market performance we used the Tobin’s Q. Due to this
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variable typically being unobservable by outsiders, a common practice is to rely on proxy
variables. For doing so, we used the construct performed by Perfect and Wiles [27] which
considers the reposition cost of total assets. Accordingly, the firm performance is:
MP3it ¼
MkCptzit þ TDit
Kit
ð7Þ
where MkCptzit is the market capitalization computed as the product between the year-end
close price per share and the number of shares outstanding per i firm; TDit is the total liabilities
at the year t; and Kit is the replacement value of firms’ assets which is estimated by Perfect and
Wiles [27] as follows:
Kit ¼ RNPit þ RINV it þ ðTAit  BNPit  BINV itÞ ð8Þ
where RNPit is the replacement cost of net property, plant and equipment (net fixed assets);
RINVit is the replacement value of inventories, TAit is the total assets; BNPit is the book value of
net property, plant and equipment; and BINVit is the book value of inventories.
RNPit ¼ RNPit1
1þ φt
1þ δit
 
þ Iit ð9Þ
For t > t0 where t0 is the first year of observations for a given company in this study; whilst
RNPit0 ¼ BNPit0 . Moreover, ϕt is the growth of capital good prices in year twhich is defined by
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflactor. In other words, φt ¼
NomGDPt
RealGDPt
100, where
NomGDPt is the nominal GDP and RealGDPt is the real GDP, both reported by the National
Institute of Statistics of Chile. δit is the real depreciation rate defined as δit ¼
Depit
BNPit
, where Depit
is the annual book depreciation. Iit is the new investment in property, plant and equipment or
capital expenditure which is defined as Iit ¼ BNPit  BNPit1 þDepit.
RINV it ¼ BINV it
2WPIt
WPIt þWPIt1
 
ð10Þ
where WPIt is the wholesale price index by country reported by the World Bank. This estima-
tion for the replacement value of inventories assumes that the inventory accounting method is
the average cost. For this method, the value of inventories reported at time t is approximately
equal to the average of the prices at t  1 and t.
The other independent variables correspond to control variables entered into the model in
order to avoid problems of misspecification. The first control variable corresponds to the
leverage at book value (LEVit) measured as the total liabilities over total assets, the company
size (SIZEit) calculated as the logarithmic transformation of total assets, the firm’s profitability
(ROAit) measured as the earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, and finally
we include the company’s default risk (RISKit) which is measured through the alternative
Altman [28] Z-Score which was specifically derived for developing countries computed as:
RISKit ¼ 6:56WCit þ 3:26REit þ 6:72EBITit þ 1:05BVEit þ 3:25 ð11Þ
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where WCit is the working capital over total assets, REit is the retained earnings over total
assets, EBITit is the earnings before interest and taxes and BVEit is the book value of equity over
total liabilities.
For country-level variables we use the Worldwide Governance Index2 (GOVINDEXt) com-
puted by Kaufmann et al. [21] as a measure of transparency across countries. This index is a
composite of six dimensions of governance including: (i) Voice and Accountability, which are
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (ii) Political Stability
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, which measure the perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, includ-
ing politically-motivated violence and terrorism; (iii) Government Effectiveness corresponds to
the quality of public and civil services, and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government's commitment to such policies; (iv) Regulatory Quality, which measures the per-
ceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development; (v) Rule of Law, which
reflects the confidence that the agents will abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence; and finally (vi) the Control of Corruption, which measures
the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private
interests. All of these six individual indicators are between 2.5 and 2.5 with increasing values
as the governance indicator improves. GOVINDEX therefore corresponds to the average value
among these six governance indicators by country and year.
Therefore, our estimation model would take the following form:
MPit ¼ β0 þ β1DACCit1 þ β2CV it þ ηi þ μt þ εit, ð12Þ
where MPit is the market performance, DACCit1 is the one-period lagged discretionary
accruals measure, CVit is a vector of control variables (e.g. LEVit, SIZEit, ROAit, and RISKit), ηi
is the individual fixed effect, μt is the time effect and εit is the stochastic error term.
GOVINDEXt variable is used to split the sample and estimate separate regressions. Addition-
ally, country, industry and time dummy variables are included in the model.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Univariate analysis
For the empirical results we proceed in two parts. As a starting point, in order to make the
empirical analysis significant, we have to test the null hypothesis that the mean values of the
discretionary accruals measures are statistically significant from zero. Previous literature sug-
gests that managers of companies with weak governance structures have greater discretion to
2
The latest update took place in September 2015. Information can be downloaded from www.govindicators.org.
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engage in opportunistic earnings management [29]. A similar situation is observed when the
regulatory environment does not efficiently constrain management’s flexibility to misrepresent
financial results [30]. The p-values reported in Table 1 suggest that the mean values of our
alternative measures of discretionary accruals are significantly different from zero. In accor-
dance with the previous literate, therefore, this preliminary finding may be used as evidence
that listed firms in our sample opportunistically manipulate their financial reports.
Additionally, we split the sample into two big groups depending on the average value of the
GOVINDEX variable by country. Although not reported, the average values were negative for
all the countries, except for Chile and Brazil. Consequently, we can state that for the group of
countries comprised of Chile and Brazil the transparency and corporate governance rules are
relatively more efficient than for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Thus, the sample slip
corresponds to these two groups, namely ‘Transparent Countries’ for those countries with
relatively better transparency and corporate governance, and ‘Opaque Countries’ corresponding
to those with relatively worse transparency and corporate governance. As observed in Table 2,
the mean difference test was applied to verify if the extent of discretionary accruals as a measure
of financial overstatement is the same across the two groups. The null hypothesis is that there is
no difference in discretionary accruals between the two groups and the alternative hypothesis is
that discretionary accruals are greater in the group of countries with relatively weaker transpar-
ency and governance. As tabulated, DACC1 is statistically greater in the set of countries which
are less transparent and where corporate governance is weaker (e.g. Argentina, Colombia,
Mexico and Peru, all of which we call the ‘Opaque Countries’) than in the set of countries such
as Chile and Brazil where institutional transparency and corporate governance are better, and
which we term the ‘Transparent Countries’. This is shown to provide evidence that more
financial statement manipulation is present when institutions and governance are weaker.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that for our three measures of market performance
(e.g. MP1, MP2 and MP3) there are positive average values for the companies included in the
sample. Additionally, a typical company finances its total assets with about 48.73% of debt. In
our sample, companies achieve an average rate of return of 4.27% on total assets. Finally, the
average indicator of transparency and quality of corporate governance (GOVINDEX) is only
0.2146 with a maximum coefficient of 1.2482, which is still far away from its theoretical
maximum achievable designated to be 2.5 [21].
The matrix of correlation coefficients is exhibited in Table 4. As would be expected, there is a
high correlation for some measures of performance, such as the 0.533 correlation coefficient
between MP2 and MP3. Similarly, high correlations are observed between the measures of
discretionary accruals. On the other hand, we do not observe relatively high levels of correla-
tion between the explanatory variables, with the exception of the correlation between the firm
size (SIZE) and its leverage (LEV) (e.g. significant correlation of 0.408) and between firms’
default risk (RISK) and the level of debt (LEV) (e.g. significant correlation of 0.691).3 These
slightly high correlations might eventually cause problems of multicollinearity in the
3Although the tabulated correlation is negative, its interpretation is in the opposite direction as a consequence of the
construction of the RISK variable where the firm risk increases as the variable decreases.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. error Std. dev. P-value
DACC1 9635 0.0217 0.0002 0.0239 0.0000
DACC2 9635 0.0260 0.0004 0.0385 0.0000
DACC3 9635 0.0276 0.0003 0.0257 0.0000
This table shows the contrast to test the null hypothesis H0 that mean values for discretionary accruals measures are zero.
The alternative hypothesis Ha is that such values are positive.
Table 1. One-sample t test.
Variables Countries Obs Mean Std. error Std. dev. Difference Ha: diff > 0
DACC1 Opaque countries 4002 0.0224 0.0004 0.0223 0.0012 0.0070
Transparent countries 5633 0.0212 0.0003 0.0249
DACC2 Opaque countries 4002 0.0262 0.0005 0.0316 0.0002 0.3770
Transparent countries 5633 0.0259 0.0006 0.0428
DACC3 Opaque countries 4002 0.0280 0.0004 0.0261 0.0006 0.1120
Transparent countries 5633 0.0273 0.0003 0.0254
This table tests the null hypothesis H0 that the difference in mean values for discretionary accruals measures are the same
between ‘Other Countries’ and ‘Chile + Brazil’ groups. The alternative hypothesis Ha is that this difference is positive.
Table 2. Two groups test with equal variances.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
MP1 0.1272 0.4908 0.8700 1.9984
MP2 8.7660 3.2880 0.0010 16.9760
MP3 6.4865 2.0207 0.0058 11.9799
DACC1 0.0217 0.0239 0.0000 0.3838
DACC2 0.0260 0.0385 0.0000 0.7007
DACC3 0.0276 0.0257 0.0000 0.2895
LEV 0.4873 0.2349 0.0072 0.9467
SIZE 6.1524 2.0842 2.0887 13.2225
ROA 0.0427 0.0945 0.4515 0.4948
RISK 7.2761 5.3480 0.1667 33.0204
GOVINDEX 0.2146 0.5851 0.6658 1.2482
This table shows the descriptive statistics (e.g. mean value, standard deviation, minimum andmaximum) for the variables
used in the empirical analysis.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables.
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regression estimates. Nevertheless, as reported in the subsequent regression tables, the vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) test allows us to accept the hypothesis of the inexistence of this
econometric problem.
4.2. Multivariate analysis
Concerning the multivariate analysis, we interpret the outcomes of the model (12) for the whole
sample according to the regression estimates shown in Table 5. This table includes nine regres-
sions for our three alternative measures of the dependent variable (e.g. MP1, MP2 and MP3)
explained by our three one-period lagged independent variables as measures of the quality of
the financial reports and earnings manipulation (e.g. DACC1, DACC2 and DACC3). As a
starting point for the interpretation of the coefficient estimates in our regression analysis, a
battery of diagnostic tests is used to ensure the validity of our results in Tables 5 and 6. Robust
standard errors were used in all the regression estimates. According to the Wald test, all the
independent variables are jointly significant at the standard confidence levels. As mentioned
Variables MP1 MP2 MP3 DACC1 DACC2 DACC3 LEV SIZE ROA RISK
MP2 0.040 1.000
(0.000)
MP3 0.030 0.533 1.000
(0.004) (0.000)
DACC1 0.028 0.025 0.065 1.000
(0.007) (0.019) (0.000)
DACC2 0.033 0.015 0.068 0.934 1.000
(0.001) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000)
DACC3 0.036 0.036 0.121 0.859 0.839 1.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEV 0.014 0.016 0.358 0.125 0.080 0.103 1.000
(0.165) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.031 0.528 0.965 0.085 0.074 0.136 0.408 1.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.184 0.115 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.029 0.274 0.004 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.266) (0.744) (0.626) (0.005) (0.000) (0.709)
RISK 0.044 0.015 0.238 0.041 0.020 0.0362 0.691 0.284 0.334 1.000
(0.000) (0.147) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GOVINDEX 0.050 0.535 0.088 0.065 0.060 0.042 0.176 0.115 0.057 0.139
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The table reports the pairwise correlation coefficient matrix. The significance level of each correlation coefficient is in
parenthesis.
Table 4. Pairwise correlation coefficients.
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above, the variance inflation factor (VIF) reported at the bottom of Tables 5 and 6 confirm that
collinearity does not skew our estimation results since the VIFs are greater than 2. Regarding the
moment conditions, the Hansen over-identification tests did not reject the over-identifying
restrictions, meaning that we accept the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments in our
estimations. Additionally, the AR(2) test proves the lack of second-order serial correlation.
Consequently, our results are not biased by a possible incorrect choice of instruments or by
autocorrelation and are robust, according to the standard diagnostic tests for panel data.
Variables MP1 MP1 MP1 MP2 MP2 MP2 MP3 MP2 MP3
DACC1t1 2.1660 6.2290
*** 2.1726***
(1.3985) (6.0160) (4.6340)
DACC2t1 6.0404
*** 5.1725*** 0.3698
(3.6418) (9.2875) (1.6330)
DACC3t1 6.6370
*** 0.5416 0.5009**
(3.3999) (1.0670) (2.3382)
LEV 2.7174 3.8098 9.3240 3.9353*** 5.5361*** 1.5004*** 1.7003*** 1.5353*** 1.5901***
(0.7238) (0.9337) (0.7826) (11.4338) (15.2080) (5.6679) (10.3436) (10.6859) (11.4474)
SIZE 0.5093 0.3941 1.2559 1.1193*** 1.2469*** 1.0573*** 0.9666*** 0.9670*** 0.9491***
(1.0917) (0.7404) (1.3556) (25.8565) (28.5999) (29.8487) (72.3698) (69.9110) (82.4417)
ROA 2.2433 8.8811*** 7.1137*** 0.0855 0.7537** 2.5251*** 0.0410 0.4219*** 0.5651***
(0.4507) (2.6688) (4.2203) (0.2407) (2.2683) (8.2591) (0.3049) (3.0741) (4.4991)
RISK 0.6709** 0.7802*** 0.5878 0.0101 0.0571*** 0.0554*** 0.0182*** 0.0029 0.0145**
(2.0610) (2.6424) (0.6086) (1.3095) (5.6442) (4.7087) (2.9191) (0.4227) (2.4912)
Constant 0.6884 3.6828 7.4544 3.7492*** 4.1199*** 3.1807*** 0.5662*** 0.3507*** 0.3625***
(0.1412) (0.6646) (0.5519) (13.6469) (14.1623) (12.9888) (4.5775) (2.6674) (3.3534)
Observations 8848 8848 8848 8965 8965 8965 9608 9608 9608
Number of iden 886 886 886 908 908 908 895 895 895
Wald test 10.860*** 15.337*** 12.138*** 577.000*** 242.250*** 671.023*** 112.337*** 62.253*** 332.902***
AR(2) 0.202 0.170 0.148 0.423 0.396 0.477 0.860 0.510 0.578
Hansen test 49.950 112.740 96.312 276.400 161.599 130.220 325.322 161.830 147.520
VIF 1.73 1.03 1.29 1.15 0.98 1.29 1.18 1.17 1.30
This table includes the estimations of model (12). Variables construction is described in Section 3.2. Industry, time and
country effects are included in the estimations but not tabulated. The Wald test of statistical significance of independent
variables is reported at the bottom of the table. Similarly, the second-order autocorrelation test is reported (AR(2)). The
Hansen contrast is used to test the hypothesis that the instruments are properly chosen. The VIF test is used to formally
examine the multicollinearity problem. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 5. Multivariate analysis for the whole sample.
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Variables MP1 MP1 MP1 MP2 MP2 MP2 MP3 MP3 MP3
DACC1t1 7.059
** 1.6018*** 1.7355*
(0.9151) (5.7779) (1.8141)
DACC1t1
*SYS 4.9041* 0.4964*** 0.8013***
(0.7209) (12.9280) (5.6391)
DACC1t1+DACC1t1
*
SYS 2.1549
*
1.1054
***
0.9342
*
DACC2t1 3.5026
*** 0.7596* 5.3086***
(3.2505) (9.2927) (5.2294)
DACC2t1
*SYST 1.9704*** 0.6997** 4.2790***
(3.1764) (15.7794) (6.9984)
DACC2t1+DACC2t1
*
SYS 1.5322
***
0.0599
**
1.0296
***
DACC3t1 2.0647
*** 0.4148*** 3.2447***
(3.0704) (9.9215) (3.7770)
DACC3t1
*SYST 1.1733*** 0.1247* 2.7271*
(2.7950) (11.9847) (3.6554)
DACC2t1+DACC2t1
*
SYS 0.8914
***
0.2901
*
0.5176
**
LEV 1.6711 10.1574 3.8463 4.3005*** 5.2190*** 0.4523 1.6498*** 1.7214*** 1.6522***
(0.2296) (1.6045) (0.2746) (11.3608) (14.3559) (1.2470) (10.4653) (11.5689) (10.5313)
SIZE 0.7768 0.6852 0.3946 1.0962*** 1.1786*** 1.0024*** 0.9617*** 0.9405*** 0.9377***
(0.8334) (0.7225) (0.2922) (25.2228) (27.2567) (25.3953) (64.1562) (63.9162) (75.0594)
ROA 9.0907 17.2895** 42.4076** 0.2355 0.6890** 2.4617*** 0.0619 0.3948** 0.5256***
(0.8169) (2.1722) (2.0678) (0.6157) (2.1810) (6.4494) (0.4093) (2.3561) (3.4411)
RISK 0.2831* 0.8423** 1.1136 0.0159 0.0709*** 0.0629*** 0.0143** 0.0029 0.0109
(0.5280) (2.4286) (1.0804) (1.4665) (6.2080) (4.0482) (2.1930) (0.3744) (1.5524)
Constant 2.5543 9.2934 16.1757 4.0527*** 4.5408*** 3.1268*** 0.4891*** 0.2535* 0.2807**
(0.2844) (1.1314) (0.9620) (13.4278) (15.6612) (10.2658) (3.9125) (1.8302) (2.2376)
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Variables MP1 MP1 MP1 MP2 MP2 MP2 MP3 MP3 MP3
Observations 8848 8848 8848 8965 8965 8965 9608 9608 9608
Number of iden 886 886 886 908 908 908 895 895 895
Wald test 762.470*** 527.150*** 649.033*** 112.934*** 270.732*** 174.122*** 133.826*** 84.724*** 137.590***
AR(2) 0.998 1.124 1.490 1.859 1.460 1.385 0.994 1.137 1.280
Hansen test 153.300 166.920 211.965 193.836 103.570 140.242 178.103 148.049 195.624
VIF 1.121 1.205 1.380 1.094 1.183 1.124 1.150 0.902 1.661
This table includes the estimations of model (12) including the interacted variables for discretionary accruals and the country-level governance index. The significance of the
linear combinations of coefficients of these variables is tested and reported in the estimates in italics. The construction of variables is described in Section 3.2. Industry, time
and country effects are included in the estimations but not tabulated. The Wald test of statistical significance of the independent variable is reported at the bottom of the
table. Similarly, the second-order autocorrelation test is reported (AR(2)). The Hansen contrast is used to test the hypothesis that the instruments are properly chosen. The
VIF test is used to formally examine the multicollinearity problem. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 6. Multivariate analysis by levels of governance.
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4.2.1. Discussion of results of the whole sample
Concerning the findings, the results systematically show that higher manipulation of financial
reports (DACC1, DACC2 or DACC3) leads to greater firm market performance (MP1, MP2
and MP3). Although in regressions (1), (6) and (8) our measures of discretionary accruals are
not statistically significant, the direction of the relationship is still positive (e.g. see Table 5).
For instance, in the second regression, we observe that an increase by one percentage point in
our first one-period lagged measure of discretionary accruals (DACC1t1) triggers an increase
of 6.0404 times the market change in the stock price. Such a large change in market prices
caused by a small change in earnings management is evidence of an elastic market perfor-
mance. According to Leuz et al. [20], earnings management can be defined as the alteration of
firms’ reported economic performance by insiders to either mislead outsiders or to influence
contractual outcomes. Our results provide evidence of this construct suggesting that when
managers overstate or misreport financial statements by actively manipulating earnings, there
is a market premium as a consequence of a general lack of transparency in the LATAM
context [21], and investor biases, despite some distinctive levels of transparence, are observed
in the region. We observe that the stock price change (MP1), the logarithmic transformation of
the enterprise value (MP2), as well as the performance measure proxied by Tobin’s Q (MP3), all
serve to increase the manipulation of financial reports.
Our results also support the Lee et al. [9] model, where firms with higher accounting perfor-
mance over-report earnings by a larger amount when looking for greater price responsiveness or
market performance. In the Lee et al. [9] model, managers manage earnings to influence the
stock price. This is a plausible explanation for our results. We suggest that under a rational
setting that is free of market frictions, where information is symmetrically distributed and where
there is complete alignment of interest between managers and shareholders, there is no room for
managers to opportunistically manage earnings to increase market performance. Under these
conditions, the market would be able to discriminate and choose a separating equilibrium as
suggested by Akerlof [18], by rationally discounting for the over-statement of earnings. This
supports the idea that buyers are guided by earnings but are unaware that earnings are inflated
by the generous use of accruals, and that this is a consequence of individual biases, wrong
perceptions and misuse of heuristics in making their financial decisions. Thus, investors are
misled to pay too high a price [31], which triggers a greater change in stock price, enterprise
value and Tobin’s Q. Hence, when there is a lack of transparency and the agency conflict is not
efficiently minimized, managers take advantage of their discretionary power to artificially boost
the market performance of the company. The major motivation behind this is basically the
improvement of contractual conditions and reward with better compensation packages. Or as
stated in terms of Teoh et al. [31], managers manage earnings to exploit market credulity. This
idea is consistent with investors naively extrapolating earnings without fully adjusting for the
potential manipulation of reported earnings [32]. Consequently, the previous findings allow us
to accept our research hypothesis that there will be a positive relationship between opportunistic
manipulation of earnings and firms’market performance.
Concerning the control variables included in the model specifications, we observe that lever-
age (LEV) does not impact on the stock price change (MP1), but it has a positive relationship
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with our two other alternative measures of market performance, namely the enterprise value
(MP2) and the proxy for Tobin’s Q (MP3). As suggested by the capital structure literature, debt
can be efficiently used to undertake profitable investment projects that the market interprets as
positive growth opportunities by pushing up the market valuation [33]. Similarly, the size of
the company (SIZE) is also positively related to its performance. According to our findings,
larger firms take advantage of economies of scale and this dimension is rewarded with a
premium in market valuation. The return on assets (ROA) is also positively associated with
the market performance. Consequently, there is a direct correspondence between the bottom-
line net income and the firms’ stock performance. Regarding our last control variable, the
default risk (RISK) is found to be negatively associated with market performance. As men-
tioned earlier, by construction, the RISK variable increases as the default risk decreases, and
consequently, the results reported in Tables 5 and 6 must be interpreted in the opposite
direction. Hence, our findings suggest that the market discounts prices when the firm is
approaching bankruptcy as suggested by the literature [28, 34].
4.2.2. Discussion of results by levels of governance
In this section on multivariate analysis, we aim to study the impact of different levels of
transparency and efficiency of country-level governance systems on the relationship between
earnings management and the firms’ market performance. As has been widely supported in
previous literature, governance systems in the Latin American region are comparatively
weaker than in other more developed economies such as the US or Europe [35–37]. Conse-
quently, such opaqueness in the financial markets and the weaker protection of investor rights
determines how actively managers over-state financial information disclosed to the mar-
kets [38]. Moreover, differences in governance systems have also been observed across Latin
American countries [39].
To disentangle this issue we add to our estimation model (12) a variable that allows us to
control for cross-country differences in governance systems and transparency. To do so, we
create a dummy variable (SYS) based on the subsamples of ‘Transparent Countries’ and
‘Opaque Countries’ described in Section 4.2. This dummy variable takes the value 1 if the
country belongs to the subsample of ‘Transparent Countries’ and zero for the subsample of
‘Opaque Countries’. Afterwards, we interact the SYS variable with our alternative measures of
discretionary accruals and create a multiplicative variable, for instance, DACCt1*SYS. This
variable allows us to measure the specific impact of discretionary accruals on firm perfor-
mance moderated by the two different levels of cross-country transparency and governance
defined in our sample.
The results reported in Table 6 indicate, on the one hand, that the one-period lagged variable
of discretionary accruals is always positively related to market performance. On the other
hand, the interacted or multiplicative variables between discretionary accruals and transpar-
ency and governance efficiency (see for instance DACCt1*SYS in the first regression in
Table 6) consistently show a negative relationship with firm performance. The interpretation
of these results are as follows. Taking the first regression in Table 6, for the subsample of
‘Transparent Countries’, namely Brazil and Chile, the SYS variable takes the value 1 and
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consequently the impact of discretionary accruals on the firm’s performance corresponds to the
addition of DACCt1 and DACCt1*SYS (=DACCt1 + DACCt1*SYS) which is reported in the
table in italic characters. In the first regression, this addition of variables takes a value equal to
2.1549. Consequently, for the ‘Transparent Countries’, a marginal increase in earnings manage-
ment (DACCt1) causes more than twice an impact on the change in stock price (MP1).
However, since SYS takes a zero value for the group of ‘Opaque Countries’, the impact of
discretionary accruals on market performance for this subset of countries corresponds only to
the coefficient estimate of the DACCt1 variable, which in the first regression goes up to 7.059.
Thus, before any marginal change in opportunistic managerial behaviour is measured through
discretionary accruals, the impact on the change in price will be more than seven times the
change in discretionary accruals. The significance of the linear combinations of coefficients is
tested and it is accepted in all cases that the addition of the discretionary accruals variables and
the interacted or multiplicative variables are statistically different from zero (e.g. see italic
characters in Table 6).
In all the subsequent regression estimates of Table 6, we observe that the impact on any
measure of market performance (MP1, MP2 or MP3) as a consequence of a change in the
discretionary accruals is systematically greater in the group of ‘Opaque Countries’ than in the
group of ‘Transparent Countries’. This may be used as robust evidence that managers take
more advantage of market myopia when institutional settings are endowed with weaker
governance systems and where greater gaps of information exist between insiders and out-
siders. In other words, although we subscribe to previous literature on the fact that governance
systems are relatively weak in the Latin American region [40], we also recognize that there are
still some intraregional differences in transparency and governance, as supported by our
findings. Thus, in more transparent financial systems and where the right of shareholders is
relatively better protected, the impact on market performance caused by opportunistic manip-
ulation of financial reports is not as large as in contexts of less transparency and governance.
We can derive out of this finding that the market is fooled in order to increase the firm’s
valuation by mispresenting the financial information. And even more, the weaker the gover-
nance systems across countries in the Latin American region, the greater the changes will be to
boost firm value by misleading the market towards making wrong investment decisions.
Finally, findings concerning the control variables listed in Table 6 remain consistent with those
previously interpreted based on Table 5. Thus, we can conclude that our overall findings are
robust to a battery of alternative test specifications and controls, as well as to elaborate
dependent and independent variables.
5. Conclusions and final remarks
The main goal of this chapter has been to measure the impact of earnings management and
reporting on market performance. We have sought to examine this phenomenon in a holistic
way. Far from a purely statistical correlation analysis, we have sought to examine the phenom-
enon in light of theories that support this from a management point of view, in an attempt to
merge the two together.
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The two major theories we have applied include agency theory and social cognitive theory.
According to Eisenhardt [12], agency theory is particularly effective when coupled with com-
plementary perspectives. We have therefore created a theoretical model that serves to illustrate
our operational model, by showing how this process happens as a whole. While it does
describe our two mediating variables, financial reporting quality and investment decision
making, we conceptually consider these to be a ‘black box’ that then allows us to focus more
on the relationship of the two variables in the extremes of the model, earnings management
and stock performance. Overall, our approach seeks to show how both a cognitive and an
agency approach can be used together to demonstrate how a firm’s earnings quality can impact
on its market performance.
A number of policy recommendations are derived from our findings. First, regulators and
those who set accounting standards may find these results useful for assessing the levels of
discretion that should be permitted to corporate managers for adjusting their financial reports.
Second, our results suggest that individual investors will behave more rationally and be more
aware in their investing decisions if the impact of discretionary accruals on the stock price is
made more apparent. Overall, we argue that there is a clear need for more transparent
financial markets and enhanced corporate governance measures.
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